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A “FULL AND FAIR” TRIAL:
CAN THE EXECUTIVE ENSURE IT ALONE?
THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF TRIALS
BY MILITARY COMMISSIONS AT
GUANTANAMO BAY
BY JENNIFER A. LOHR*
“If, as may be hoped, we are now to enter upon a new era of law in
the world, it becomes more important than ever before for the nations creating that system to observe their greatest traditions of administering justice . . . both in their own judging and in their new
1
creation.”

I. INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such
organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.”2 Pursuant to this authorization, military operations were soon initiated in Afghanistan
3
against al Qaeda and the Taliban. As most of the country and Congress were focused on repairing damaged landscapes and senses of security at home in addition to the impending conflict in Afghanistan,
select members of the Executive Branch were involved in drafting a
plan for bringing justice to those involved in terrorism against the
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* Jennifer A. Lohr is a 2005 graduate of Duke University School of Law.
1. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 42 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
2. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter “Authorization for Use of Military
Force”].
3. See, e.g., Vernon Loeb, Second Day of Strikes Includes Searching For Mobile Targets;
U.S. Seeks Taliban Troops on the Run, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2001, at A8 (describing the first two
days of military action in Afghanistan).
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United States.4 This plan was outlined in the President’s Military Or5
der of November 13, 2001 [hereinafter “Military Order”].
As early as January of 2002, individuals captured in Afghanistan
and suspected of terrorist activities were brought to the detention facility set up by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay Naval
6
Base, Cuba. Just as quickly, the legality of the detentions and trials
by commission were called into question both at home and abroad.
Though many controversies and legal challenges have arisen concerning the detention and trial of suspected terrorists at Guantanamo
Bay, an issue that has yet to be clearly addressed is what will happen
at the end of a successful trial by Military Commission.
President Bush’s Military Order precludes judicial review of any
7
type for those individuals falling under the Military Order. However,
the Supreme Court held in June of 2004 that statutory habeas review
will be available in the federal courts to challenge detention in Guantanamo Bay.8 Further, even case law cited by the Government as
precedent for the use of military tribunals or commissions shows implicit past support for the use of federal habeas actions to challenge
the legality of the tribunals and their jurisdiction over the individuals
subject to trial in territories within the jurisdiction of the United
States.9 Although this case law purported to limit such review to jurisdictional questions only, the outer limit of federal court jurisdiction
4. See Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2004, at A1 (discussing the “aggressive approach” developed in secrecy by a small group of
White House officials which enabled the military to detain and prosecute foreign suspects, including those held at Guantanamo Bay).
5. Military Order, 66 Fed. Reg. 57833 (Nov. 13, 2001) (entitled, “Detention, Treatment,
and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism”) [hereinafter “Military Order”].
6. Jim Garamone, Joint Task Force Set Up in Cuba to Oversee Al Qaeda Detainees,
AMER. FORCES INFO. SERV., Jan. 11, 2002, available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/
Jan2002/n01112002_20020111.html.
7. Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 7(b).
8. Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2698 (2004).
9. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777–78, 785 (1950) (addressing the constitutionality of military trials of nonresident enemy aliens in Nanking, China , even while finding
that such individuals had no constitutional right to assert a federal habeas challenge to the trials). Such habeas claims were also used to challenge the legality of World War II military trials
taking place in the United States or its insular possessions. See generally In re Yamashita, 327
U.S. 1 (1946) (addressing trial of Japanese General by military commission in the Philipines);
Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (addressing trial of Nazi saboteurs by military commission in
the United States). Similarly, statutory habeas actions are now being used to challenge the legality of the current commissions and the designation of certain individuals for trial under their
jurisdiction prior to the commencement of trial. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d
152 (D.D.C. 2004).
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over the Guantanamo Bay detainees was left open by the Supreme
10
Court in Rasul.
This note seeks to address the level and type of judicial review
that will be available after the completion of a Military Commission
trial. For purposes of addressing this issue, the constitutionality of
the use of commissions to try detainees will be assumed. It will be argued that, at a minimum, federal habeas jurisdiction must be available
to satisfy both national and international law. However, ideally a
more thorough form of judicial review should be available, to avoid
separation of powers problems and to satisfy domestic and international due process guarantees. Further, from a normative perspective, allowing judicial review in the form of appellate jurisdiction over
the procedure and legal findings of the Commissions would be desirable, as it would lend credibility and transparency to procedures that
have thus far been wrought with controversy.
II. PROCEDURES FOR MILITARY
COMMISSIONS AT GUANTANAMO BAY
The Military Order sets forth procedures for the detention and
trial of individuals who are not citizens of the United States and who
are determined by the President to be a member of al Qaeda, and
have “engaged in, aided or abetted, or conspired to commit, acts of
international terrorism, or acts in preparation therefore” or “knowingly harbored [such] individuals.”11 Such individuals are to be detained in accordance with conditions prescribed by the Secretary of
Defense,12 and “when tried, be tried by military commission for any
and all offenses triable by military commission that such individual is
13
alleged to have committed.”
The Military Order delegates to the Secretary of Defense the responsibility to issue “such orders and regulations” necessary to govern the military commissions, including but not limited to “rules for
the conduct of the proceedings of the military commissions, including
pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, modes of proof, issuance of
process, and qualifications of attorneys,” providing that at a minimum

10.
11.
12.
13.

Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.
Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 2(a)(1).
Id. at sec. 3.
Id. at sec. 4(a).
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detainees would receive a “full and fair trial.”14 Review and final decision on any trial would be performed by the President or the Secre15
tary of Defense. Finally, the Military Order provides that military
commissions shall have exclusive jurisdiction with regard to offenses
by individuals subject to the order, and that such individuals “shall
not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought
on the individual’s behalf, in (i) any court of the United States, or any
state thereof, (ii) any court of any foreign nation, or (iii) any international tribunal.”16
The Secretary of Defense issued regulations setting forth the
procedures for commissions established pursuant to the Military Order.17 These regulations provide for appointment of the members of
each Commission, including a Presiding Officer, by the Appointing
Authority, a designee of the Secretary of Defense.18 The Presiding
19
Officer heads the proceedings of the Commission. A record of the
trial is to be made by the Commission and authenticated by the Presiding officer.20 Upon completion of trial, this record is to be transmitted to the Appointing Authority or to a Review Panel if the Secre21
The
tary of Defense is acting as the Appointing Authority.
Appointing Authority performs an administrative review of the record of trial, and, if satisfied that the proceedings were administra-

14. Id. at sec. 4(b)-(c). Authority for this provision is derived from section 836 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which allows the President to prescribe similar procedural rules and regulations for cases arising under the UCMJ which are triable in courts-martial,
military commissions and other military tribunals. 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (2000). Principles of law
and the rules of evidence generally recognized in U.S. district courts shall be applied, in so far as
considered practicable by the President. Id. However, regulations prescribed may not be contrary to or inconsistent with the UCMJ. Id.
15. Military Order, supra note 5, sec. 4(c)(8).
16. Id. at sec. 7(b).
17. 32 C.F.R. §§ 9–17.
18. Id. at §§ 9.2, 9.4. Each Commission is to have between three and seven members. Id.
at § 9.4(a)(2). Each member is to be a commissioned officer of the United States armed forces
(‘Military Officers’). Id. at § 9.4(a)(3). The Presiding Officer is to be a judge advocate of any
United States armed force. Id. at § 9.4(a)(4). Members may be removed by the Appointing
Authority for good cause. Id. at § 9.4(a)(3).
19. Id. at § 9.4(a)(4). See also id. at § 9.4(a)(5) (listing duties of the Presiding Officer).
20. Id. at § 9.6(h)(1).
21. Id. The Review Panel shall consist of three Military Officers, at least one of whom
shall have experience as a judge, appointed by the Secretary of Defense. Id. at § 9.6(h)(4).
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tively complete, transmits the record of trial to the Review Panel.22
The Review Panel then reviews the record of trial and within thirty
days either forwards the case to the Secretary of Defense with a recommendation as to disposition or returns the case to the Appointing
23
Authority for further proceedings. The Secretary of Defense then
performs a similar review of the record, either returning the case for
further proceedings, forwarding it to the President with a recommendation as to disposition, or making the final determination if designated by the President to perform this function.24
Trial by the Commission commences when the Appointing Authority refers the charges of an individual who is subject to the Mili25
tary Order to the Commission. On July 3, 2003, the President determined that six detainees would be eligible for trial by Military
26
Commission. At the date of this note, four detainees have been designated for trial by the Appointing Authority, although fifteen have
27
now been determined eligible by the President. The progress of the
trials has been delayed by motions to the Commissions themselves, as
well as challenges in the United States Federal Courts. In November
of 2004, the decision by the United States District Court of the District of Columbia in the case of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld28 brought into
question further progress by the Commissions.29 For purposes of this
note, which seeks only to address post-trial review of the Military

22. Id. at § 9.6(h)(3). If the Appointing Authority is not satisfied that the proceedings of
the Commission were administratively complete, the case shall be returned for any necessary
supplementary proceedings. Id.
23. Id. at § 9.6(h)(4). During this review, the Review Panel may, in its discretion, review
any written submissions from the Prosecution and the Defense. Id. Deliberations are to take
place in closed conference. Id. Any variance from the procedures spelled out in the Department of Defense’s regulations shall be disregarded where they “would not materially have affected the outcome of the trial before the Commission.” Id.
24. Id. at § 9.6(h)(5)–(6).
25. Id. at § 9.2.
26. News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, President Determines Enemy Combatants
Subject to His Military Order ( July 3, 2003), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/
releases/2003/nr20030703-0173.html.
27. Guantanamo Bay Detainees Legal Update, GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/guantanamo-bay_legal.htm (last modified Nov. 9,
2004).
28. 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
29. The four cases designated for trial are currently in abeyance, pending the outcome of
the federal litigation. Kathleen Rhem, Parties Still Working Behind the Scenes on Military
Commissions,
AMER.
FORCES
INFO.
SERV.,
Mar.
8,
2005,
available
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/cgi-bin/dlprint.cgi? http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/2005
0308_118.html.
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Commissions, the ongoing challenges to the constitutionality of the
Military Commissions will be illustrative of considerations that will be
important in determining the availability and scope of post-trial judicial review.
III. HISTORICAL USE OF JUDICIAL
OVERSIGHT OF MILITARY COMMISSIONS
Historically, the United States has used military commissions
while in the battlefield to try spies, saboteurs, and other violations of
the laws of war.30 Additionally, military commissions have been used
in occupied territories to try common crimes where local courts may
be insufficient, or to fill a legal vacuum where armed conflict disables
the civil courts.31 The use of military commissions as an “exception to
the ‘preferred’ method of civilian trial [was] thus justified by necessity” and often consisted of impromptu proceedings to distribute justice on the battlefield.32 The use of military commissions by the
United States in recent times has been limited, and the key cases
dealing with the constitutionality of military commissions arose in regards to their use during the Civil War and World War II.
33
In Ex parte Milligan, the Supreme Court held that military
commissions organized during the civil war, in a state not invaded or
engaged in rebellion, in which the federal courts were open and exercising their jurisdiction, had no jurisdiction to try, convict, or sentence
a citizen who was neither a resident of a rebellious state, a prisoner of
war, nor a person in the military.34 Thus, while Milligan’s holding was
limited to the trial of citizens by military commissions, it also provided precedent for judicial inquiry into the legality of the authority
and jurisdiction of military commissions,35 an inquiry that is evident in
the following cases dealing with World War II military commissions.
During World War II, the Court had several opportunities to
deal with the military commissions. First, in 1942 the Court held con30. STEPHEN DYCUS, ET. AL, NATIONAL SECURITY LAW, 889 (3d ed. 2002).
31. Id. at 889, 901. See Henry J. Fletcher, The Civilian and the War Power, 2 MINN. L. REV.
110, 123 (1918) (describing “time of war” as meaning “when the ordinary courts are not in the
usual and open exercise of their functions”).
32. DYCUS, supra note 30, at 901. See also Fletcher, supra note 31, at 116–17 (stating that
the majority in Milligan took the view that war powers used to conduct military commissions
were founded upon necessity, and therefore were justified in front of the judiciary only by necessity).
33. 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
34. Id. at 118, 121–22.
35. Id. at 118; Fletcher, supra note 31, at 115–17.
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stitutional President Roosevelt’s military order establishing military
commissions to try eight Nazi saboteurs captured on U.S. soil, in Ex
36
parte Quirin. While the 1942 Military Order was directed specifically at the eight Nazi defendants,37 on the same day, President Roosevelt issued a Proclamation subjecting to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals all “subjects, citizens or residents of any nation at war with
the United States” who entered or attempted to enter United States
territory during a time of war and were charged with violations of
war.38 It is also notable that the President’s Proclamation stated “such
persons shall not be privileged to seek any remedy or maintain any
proceeding, directly or indirectly, or to have any such remedy or proceeding sought on their behalf” in federal or state courts.39
In hearing petitioners’ post-conviction habeas claim, even while
acknowledging the general prohibition of judicial review contained in
the Proclamation, the Court rejected the Government’s claim that it
could not consider whether the application of the Proclamation to the
defendants in question was proper or whether their trial by military
40
commission was unconstitutional. However, finding that the military
commissions were constitutional and had exercised proper jurisdiction over the defendants, the Court stated that it would not consider
other unrelated issues and was unconcerned with “any question of the
41
guilt or innocence” of the defendants. Further,
[T]he detention and trial of petitioners—ordered by the President
in the declared exercise of his powers as Commander in Chief of
the Army in time of war and of grave public danger—are not to be
set aside by the courts without the clear conviction that they are in
conflict with the Constitution or laws of Congress constitutionally
42
enacted.

Therefore, while offering support for a review of the propriety of
military commissions and their jurisdiction over defendants, Quirin

36. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 48 (1942).
37. Appointment of a Military Commission, Exec. Order No. 9185, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July
2, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Military Order].
38. Proclamation No. 2561, 7 Fed. Reg. 5101 (July 2, 1942) [hereinafter 1942 Proclamation].
39. Id.
40. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 24–25.
41. Id. at 25.
42. Id. The court rejected petitioners’ argument that Milligan stood for the rule that the
law of war could not be applied to citizens in states in which “the courts are open and their
process unobstructed,” finding that that ruling was limited to the particular facts of that case.
Id. at 45 (citing Milligan, 71 U.S. at 121).
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also represents support for deference to the authority of the President
43
to create military tribunals in a time of war.
Four years later, the Court denied a habeas petition from the
Commanding General of the Fourteenth Army Group of the Imperial
Japanese Army in the Philippine Islands, who had been tried and
convicted for violation of the laws of war by a military commission in
44
the Philippines, in In re Yamashita. There, the petitioner sought habeas review claiming that the military commission was without lawful
authority or jurisdiction because it was convened after hostilities between the United States and Japan had ended, failed to charge petitioner with a violation of the law of war, and did not provide a fair
trial in violation of the laws of war, the Geneva Convention, and the
Fifth Amendment.45 As in Quirin, the Court emphasized that on application for habeas corpus concern was not with the guilt or innocence of the petitioner, but only with the lawful power of the commission to try the petitioner for the offense charged.46 So long as the
authority of the commission was lawful, correction of any errors of
decision was not for the Court to perform, but rather for the military
authorities who alone had been authorized to review the decisions.47
Regardless, as in Quirin, the Court went on to address the substantive
nature of the petitioner’s claims, though holding against him.48
Finally, in Johnson v. Eisentrager,49 the Court addressed the “jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authori-

43. It should be noted that the Court in Quirin repeatedly cited Congressional authority for
creating commissions, 317 U.S. at 26–30, and that many scholars have used this point, in addition to the formal declaration of war, to distinguish the Quirin commissions from the current
commissions. Additionally, consideration of additional factors such as the public reaction to the
capture of the saboteurs, as well as executive pressure on the court, provide an interesting lens
from which to view the Quirin Court’s decision. See Jack Goldsmith & Cass R. Sunstein, Comment, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a Difference Sixty Years Makes, 19 CONST.
COMMENT. 261, 271 (2002) (listing examples of public and media outcry over judicial intervention into military commissions and finding that “[i]n the context of the events of late 1942, the
decision in Quirin to limit Milligan and to uphold the validity of Roosevelt’s Military Commission was not viewed as a big deal”). See infra note 92 and accompanying text for discussion of
these issues in regards to the current commissions.
44. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 5 (1946).
45. Id. at 5–6.
46. Id. at 8.
47. Id.
48. See id. at 25 (concluding that “the order convening the commission was a lawful order,
that the commission was lawfully constituted, that petitioner was charged with violation of the
law of war, and that the commission had authority to proceed with the trial, and in doing so did
not violate any military, statutory, or constitutional command”).
49. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
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ties in dealing with enemy aliens overseas.”50 Petitioners in this case
were twenty-one German nationals who were captured while engaging in the service of German armed forces in China after the surrender of Germany and convicted of violating laws of war by a military
commission constituted by the U.S. Commanding General at Nanking, China.51 After the conviction, the sentences were duly reviewed
and approved by military approving authority, upon which time the
prisoners were repatriated to serve their sentences at Landsberg
Prison in Germany.52 The prisoners then petitioned for writs of habeas corpus, claiming that their trial, conviction, and imprisonment
were unconstitutional and violated the Geneva Convention governing
treatment of prisoners of war.53
In denying the petitions, the court stated that “the nonresident
enemy alien . . . does not have even . . . qualified access to our courts,
for he neither has . . . claims upon our institutions nor could his use of
54
them fail to be helpful to the enemy.” Yet, even while denying habeas, the court acknowledged that “the doors of our courts have not
been summarily closed upon these prisoners.”55 First, hearings had
been provided to determine whether the right to habeas existed for
56
the petitioners. Additionally, although the Court denied that petitioners had the right to challenge the constitutionality of the military
commissions, it went on to evaluate the legality of the commissions
under the constitution and the Geneva Conventions, finding the
commissions proper under both.57

50. Id. at 765.
51. Id. at 765–66.
52. Id. at 766.
53. Id. at 767. Specifically, the petitioners claimed violations of Articles I and III, and the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Id.
54. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 776 (1950). The Court went on to find six factors
important to the finding that petitioners had no constitutional right to habeas review: that they
were enemy aliens; had never been or resided in the U. S.; were captured outside of U.S. territory and held there in military custody as prisoners of war; were tried and convicted by a military commission sitting outside of the U.S.; were charged with and tried for offenses against laws
of war committed outside the U.S.; and were at all times imprisoned outside of the U.S. Id. at
777.
55. Id. at 780.
56. Id. at 781.
57. See id. at 782-90. See also id at 794 (Black, J., dissenting) (reading Quirin and Yamashita to stand for the proposition that enemy aliens can at least challenge the legality of their
commissions in federal court).
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IV. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF DETENTIONS
AND PROCEEDINGS AT GUANTANAMO BAY
As discussed, supra Part III, military tribunals have not been subject to judicial review throughout history, for both legal and practical
reasons. However, just as the legal landscape has changed in the
sixty-plus years since Ex parte Quirin and Johnson v. Eisentrager, so
has the nature of warfare and national security changed from a practical standpoint. From a legal perspective, changes in international
law such as the worldwide ratification of the Geneva Conventions in
1949, and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights
ratified by the United States in 1994, as well as the domestic adoption
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice in 1950 and domestic extensions of criminal law, are all factors that narrow the relevance of decisions limiting judicial review of military commissions during World
58
War II. From a practical standpoint, the United States has not been
involved in a formally declared war since World War II. The current
conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq involve both enemy armed forces
and unlawful enemy combatants or insurgents.59 Finally, the greater
“War on Terror” has no definable boundaries, making the world its
battlefield with no likelihood of a definitive conclusion.60 Given these
changes, it is difficult to apply the traditional justifications for, as well
as limitations on, military commissions when questions arise about
the constitutionality of detention and trial of detainees in Guantanamo Bay.
The first set of issues was decided by the Supreme Court in June
of 2004, when it held that both citizen and alien detainees had a statutory right to petition for habeas review of the legality of their deten61
tion and classification as enemy combatants. The Court’s holding in
58. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Military Attorneys Assigned to the Defense in the Office of
Military Commissions as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, at 21–29, Al Odah v.
United States, 2004 WL 96765 (2004) [hereinafter Amicus Brief of Military Commission Defense Attorneys].
59. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Jurisdiction of Military Commissions and the Ambiguous War on
Terrorism, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 345, 346 (2002) (suggesting four possibilities for characterizing the
post-September 11 “war” and its parties: (1) a metaphorical “war on terrorism,” of worldwide
scope and indefinite duration; (2) an international armed conflict against Al Qaeda as a quasistate; (3) an international armed conflict in Afghanistan, though not against Afghanistan; and
(4) a proxy war “in the context of the quarter-century-old internal armed conflict in Afghanistan”).
60. Id. at 346–47.
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2635 (2004) (“[D]ue process demands that a citizen
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest
the factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct.
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Rasul v. Bush, which left open “[w]hether and what further proceedings may become necessary” after the Government responds to claims
62
that detainees are being held illegally, will have important impacts
upon the availability of judicial review for alien detainees determined
to be eligible for trial by military commission.
In rejecting the Government’s claim that, under Eisentrager, the
Court could not review the claims of foreign nationals held in Guantanamo Bay, the majority distinguished the situation of the current
detainees to those in Eisentrager. Important to the Court was the distinction that those detained in Guantanamo Bay pursuant to the Military Order were not nationals of countries at war with the United
States, were never charged or convicted of wrong, were never afforded access to any tribunal, and in fact denied engaging in or plot63
ting acts of aggression against the United States. Further, the Court
distinguished Guantanamo Bay from the Landsberg prison in Germany, finding that the detainees were imprisoned in territory under
the exclusive jurisdiction and control of the United States.64 Ultimately, however, the Court based its decision on the fact that the Eisentrager court addressed whether detainees had a constitutional right
to habeas, while in this case “subsequent decisions of [the] Court have
filled the statutory gap that had occasioned Eisentrager’s resort to
‘fundamentals,’” thus allowing for a statutory right to habeas review
extending to Guantanamo Bay.65
Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment, expressing concern
that the majority’s approach failed to follow the framework of Eisentrager, and that the habeas petition “was not within the proper realm
of the judicial power,” but rather “concerned matters within the exclusive province of the Executive, or the Executive and Congress, to
66
determine.” Thus, from Eisentrager comes the indication “that there
is a realm of political authority over military affairs where the judici67
ary may not enter.” However, a “necessary corollary” to this principle is that circumstances will exist in which courts maintain the power

2686, 2696 (2004) (“Application of the habeas statute to persons detained at [Guantanamo Bay]
is consistent with the historical reach of the writ of habeas corpus.”).
62. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699.
63. Id. at 2693.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2695.
66. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 2700.
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and responsibility to protect persons from unlawful detention even
68
where military affairs are implicated.
Therefore, the court must perform an initial inquiry into the general circumstances of the detention to determine whether to entertain
69
a habeas petition. In this case, two critical facts distinguished Guantanamo detainees from the situation in Eisentrager. First, the fact that
“Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and . . . one far removed from any hostilities,” supported the
claim of the detainees.70 Second, unlike the prisoners in Eisentrager,
who were already determined to be enemy combatants through military commission procedures, the Guantanamo detainees were being
held indefinitely, with no procedure to determine their status.71 For
those reasons, Justice Kennedy supported federal court jurisdiction to
determine the legality of detentions in this case, while stopping short
of supporting “automatic statutory authority” for habeas claims
72
brought by persons located outside of the United States.
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, dissented, disagreeing with the Court’s analysis of habeas
case law subsequent to Eisentrager and finding that the Court’s ruling
contradicted Eisentrager, “a half-century-old precedent on which the
73
military undoubtedly relied.” The dissent further warned that the
Court’s decision would have breathtaking consequences, permitting
any alien captured in a foreign theatre of war to bring a habeas petition against the Secretary of Defense.74
The ramifications of the Rasul decision on the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo were almost immediately seen. While the
Government set up a Combatant Status Review Tribunal to provide
the procedure and legal classification that the Court had found lack75
ing, attorneys for the detainees brought forth habeas petitions in regards to the detentions.76 For some detainees who faced trial by mili68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
72. Id. at 2701.
73. Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2706.
75. See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Defense, First Combatant Status Tribunal Conducted
at Guantanamo Today (July 30, 2004), at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2004/nr200407301076.html.
76. The Ninth Circuit decided that the proper venue for such proceedings is the District
Court for the District of Columbia. Gherebi v. Bush, 374 F.3d 727, 739 (9th Cir. 2004). As of
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tary commission, habeas petitions were used to preemptively challenge the constitutionality of the commissions in addition to their de77
tention. In November, the District Court for the District of Columbia issued a ruling that “shot several major holes in the
78
administration’s anti-terrorism positions,” most notably by holding
that the President does not have “untrammeled power” to establish
military commissions.79
Perhaps the biggest hurdle created for the Government by the
decision was the ruling that Salim Ahmed Hamdan, a detainee who
was captured in Afghanistan during hostilities and who had asserted
his entitlement to prisoner-of-war status under the Third Geneva
Convention must have the benefit of a competent tribunal to determine whether he was entitled to such status.80 Determination that an
individual was an enemy combatant made unilaterally by the President, pursuant to the Military Order, was insufficient to meet this requirement.81 Likewise, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal did
not meet the “competent tribunal” requirement because it was established not to address detainees’ status under the Geneva Conventions, but to comply with the Supreme Court’s mandate in Hamdi
that, in order to continue detention, determination must be made that
a detainee is properly detained as an enemy combatant.82 Thus,
Hamdan would be presumed to have prisoner-of-war status, unless or
83
until it was shown to be otherwise.
However, even if Hamdan did not have prisoner-of-war status,
the procedures used by Military Commissions may not be “contrary
to or inconsistent with” the Uniform Code of Military Justice

early 2005, two federal judges in the District of Columbia have issued conflicting opinions on
the issue of whether detainees can substantively challenge their confinement as enemy combatants. Compare In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 445 (D.D.C. 2005) (concluding that petitioners had stated valid claims under the Fifth Amendment and that the procedures set up by the government to make determinations regarding enemy combatant status
violated petitioners’ due process rights) with Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311, 314 (D.D.C.
2005) (concluding no viable theory exists under which habeas may be issued and dismissing petitioners’ claims as a matter of law).
77. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004).
78. Marcia Coyle, Judging the Tribunals: Circuit to Weigh President’s Powers over Detainees, NAT’L LAW J. Vol. 27, 1 (Nov. 22, 2004).
79. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 158.
80. Id. at 156.
81. Id. at 162 (“The President is not a ‘tribunal,’ however.”).
82. Id.
83. Id.
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(UCMJ).84 The District Court addressed the differences between the
Military Commissions and the court-martial proceedings afforded
under the UCMJ, finding remarkable differences in two important respects.85 First, the Court briefly addressed the structure of the reviewing authority after trial, finding that the lack of review provided by
the judicial branch was not contrary to or inconsistent with the
UCMJ.86 Further, the Court did not find problematic the fact that the
President or Secretary of Defense are the final reviewing authority, as
87
“that, after all, is what a military commission is.”
However, the second difference, the power to exclude the accused from hearings and deny access to evidence presented against
him if it is deemed classified or otherwise protected, was found much
88
more problematic. The Court identified contradictions between this
procedural rule and the confrontation clause in American law,89 as
well as the right to trial “in [one’s] presence” established by the Geneva Convention and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Geneva Convention (ICCPR).90 Because of these
inconsistencies, the Court found the rules of the Military Commission
unlawful, as they were “fatally ‘contrary to or inconsistent with’” the
statutory requirements of the UCMJ.91
Not surprisingly, this judgment caused outcry among members of
the executive branch, who immediately sought expedited review of an
92
appeal of the district court decision. It remains to be seen whether

84. See 10 U.S.C. § 836(a) (allowing the President to prescribe pretrial, trial, and post-trial
procedures for military commissions, so long as they are not “contrary to or inconsistent with”
the UCMJ).
85. Id. at 166.
86. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 167. The Court justified this, in part, based upon the panel
of “some of the most distinguished civilian lawyers in the country” that have been appointed by
the President as members of the Review Panel. Id. See also Dep’t of Defense, Military
Commission
Biographies,
at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/commissions_
biographies.html (listing members of the Review Panel).
87. Hamdan, 344 F.Supp. 2d at 167.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 168 (“It is obvious beyond the need for citation that such a dramatic deviation
from the confrontation clause could not be countenanced in any American court . . . “).
90. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 14.3(d), 999
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, art. 75.4(e), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
91. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 168.
92. See Coyle, supra note 78 (quoting Assistant Attorney General Peter Keisler as saying
the rulings “‘represent an unprecedented judicial intrusion into the prerogatives of the president’ and have ‘potentially very broad and dangerous ramifications’”); Dan Eggen, Ashcroft
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the district court decision will withstand appellate scrutiny. Counsel
for Hamdan sought expedited review of petition for certiorari in the
Supreme Court before judgment of the Court of Appeals, citing the
extraordinary circumstances of the case, the importance of Military
Commissions, and the tremendous significance of the decision of the
District Court on other cases dealing with trial of detainees.93 The
motion for expedited review was denied by the Supreme Court on
94
December 6, 2004, and Hamdan’s petition for certiorari was denied
on January 18, 2005.95 Oral arguments in front of the D.C. Circuit
took place on April 7, 2005.96
V. POST-TRIAL JUDICIAL
REVIEW OF GUANTANAMO COMMISSIONS
The question of post-trial judicial review of the current Military
Commissions is one that has not yet been addressed, most likely due
to the delay in proceedings for the few detainees actually designated
as eligible for trial. As discussed, supra Part IV, case law dealing with
the use of military commissions provides limited help in addressing
the question of whether and how the courts may review decisions by
the current Military Commissions, as those cases were decided in
times of a declared war and when Congressional approval of the
commissions more clearly existed.
Furthermore, even the legal principles that may be taken from
the World War II cases seem contradictory at times. Often, even
while professing that petitioners had no right to judicial review of
their claims, the Court then went on to analyze and to rule on those
claims nonetheless. Because the Court held in favor of the Government’s use of military commissions, the decision to review the governmental action was non-controversial. It is arguable that the Court

Denies Court Rulings; ‘Second-Guessing’ Bush on Security Raises Risks, He Says, WASH. POST,
Nov. 13, 2004, at A6 (quoting former Attorney General John Ashcroft as describing court decisions limiting President Bush’s powers “a profoundly disturbing trend”).
93. See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), petition for cert.
filed, 2004 WL 2678664 (U.S. Nov. 22, 2004) (No. 04-702).
94. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152 (D.D.C. 2004), motion of petitioner to expedite review, 73 USLW 3336 (Dec. 6, 2004) (No. 04-702).
95. Certiorari – Summary Dispositions (Order List: 543 U.S.), SUPREME COURT COURT
ORDERS, Jan. 18, 2005, at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/courtorders/011805pzor.pdf.
96. See Transcript of Proceedings (Apr. 7, 2005), Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, No. 04-5393, (D.C.
Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Court of Appeals Transcript], available at http://www.law.georgetown.
edu/faculty/nkk/documents/HamdanDCCircuitTranscript.PDF (last visited May 9, 2005).
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addressed petitioner’s claims in each case merely to bolster its deci97
sion that judicial review was unnecessary and improper.
Thus, application of these cases and their principles to the current commissions will not provide clear answers as to the Court’s
proper jurisdiction in regards to post-trial review of the Guantanamo
Commissions. Already the Court has distinguished these cases, based
on the geographical locations of the commissions and differences in
the type of armed conflicts, to allow for habeas review for detention
and pretrial proceedings. Most recently, in Hamdan, the District
Court of the District of Columbia has shown itself willing to take
more than a perfunctory look at whether the authority and procedures of the Military Commissions are proper under the constitution
98
and under the UCMJ.
Therefore, at a minimum the level of judicial review that must be
provided after the completion of a trial by the Military Commissions
will consist of habeas review as to the legality of the authority and jurisdiction of the commission. Based on the recent detainee cases, it
seems likely that the federal courts will go further in their inquiry of
the constitutionality of the commissions, to include the procedures
used to reach final judgments. Of course, legitimate concerns still exist in regards to allowing too much judicial oversight into the trial of
suspected terrorists, the most compelling of which are the classified
99
nature of much of the evidence and the security of judges and juries.
Such concerns provide support for judicial deference to military factfinding, yet courts should still retain authority to examine the validity
of the commission procedures and decisions.100
Such heightened inquiry into the constitutionality of both the jurisdiction and proceedings of the Guantanamo Military Commissions
is not only permissible, but is also desirable, based upon the need to
uphold separation of powers, to follow domestic and international
laws of war and human rights, and for general policy reasons. Each of
these reasons will be discussed in detail below.
97. However, this approval based upon a review deferential to the Government was problematic in that it ignored glaring problems with the procedures employed by the commissions, as
discussed infra at notes 125-128.
98. See supra notes 84–91.
99. See Ruth Wedgwood, Tribunals and the Events of September 11, ASIL INSIGHT, Dec.
2001, available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh80.htm.
100. Similar arguments support the judicial review of detainee classification procedures. See
generally David A. Martin, Offshore Detainees and the Role of Courts After Rasul v. Bush: The
Underappreciated Virtues of Deferential Review, 25 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 125 (2005) (examining the level of judicial review that should be afforded to enemy combatant classifications).
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A. Separation of Powers
The bounds of the President’s commander-in-chief powers are
still being tested in regards to the current war on terror. On one side,
members of the Executive have stood by the position that the President’s discretion to act in protection of national security in the after101
math of September 11 must not be hampered. On the other side,
many in the legal community as well as Congress have decried the
President’s actions as circumventing the constitutional civil liberties
and separation of powers.102
Military Commissions have traditionally gained their legitimacy
from Congressional grants of authority or, at least, from Congres103
sional approval of presidential action. Though a thorough evaluation is not presented within this note, it is notable that the authority
behind the current Military Commissions remains unclear. While the
Authorization for Use of Military Force in Afghanistan provides the
President latitude to take action in response to September 11, it contains no authorization of the use of military commissions to try suspected terrorists.104 Likewise sections 821 and 836 of the UCMJ establish the jurisdiction of military tribunals in general but do not give
clear authorization for the establishment of the Guantanamo Bay
Military Commissions.105
Even assuming Congressional authorization, the Military Commissions, like other Article I tribunals, are necessarily inferior to the
101. See, e.g., Eggen, supra note 92 (detailing former Attorney General Ashcroft’s comments that judicial review of presidential action in the area of national security creates even
greater security risks). See also Robert H. Bork & David B. Rivkin, Jr., A War the Courts
Shouldn’t Manage, WASH. POST, Jan. 21, 2005, at A17 (stating that, rather than fostering “the
false impression that the executive branch is trampling on constitutional liberties,” the judiciary
should defer to the executive branch’s “extensive prerogatives in foreign affairs [which] are
grounded in its unique expertise, information and unitary nature”).
102. See Kate Martin, More Power for Bush: Alberto Gonzales Ordered Deference to the
President, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 23, 2002, at 45 (criticizing the President’s policy in Guantanamo
Bay as having “engineered an extraordinary assumption of presidential power over the lives of
individuals, unchecked by the separation of powers”); Goldsmith & Sunstein, supra note 43, at
271–73 (comparing the reactions of Congress, the mainstream press and members of the legal
academy to the current commissions with reactions to the 1942 commissions and finding the current reaction by these institutions to be “vehement, and sometimes strident, opposition”). For
further examples of both viewpoints, see Peter Slevin & George Lardner, Jr., Bush Plan for Terrorism Trials Defended; Military Tribunals Appropriate in War, Ashcroft Says; Critics Cite Constitution, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2001, at A28.
103. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F.Supp. 2d 152, 158–60 (detailing Congressional authority for World War II military commissions).
104. See Authorization for Use of Military Force, supra note 2.
105. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 821, 836 (2000).
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head of the judiciary, the Supreme Court.106 A comparison can be
drawn to the review provided by the Supreme Court to decisions by
the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, the Article I tribunal established by the UCMJ to hear appeals from courts-martial deci107
sions. Decisions are reviewed on a discretionary basis, on certiorari
in the Supreme Court.108 Such review is consistent with the view that
all tribunals established by Congress or the President, insofar as they
perform adjudicatory functions, must be subject to review by the head
of the judicial branch.109 Similar discretionary review for decisions of
the Military Commissions by the Supreme Court, once all review
within the chain of command has been exhausted, will provide necessary balancing of powers.
In addition to citing Acts of Congress as sources of authority, the
Military Order also purports to derive authority from the President’s
110
Article II commander-in-chief powers. Although it is clear that the
President has the power and discretion to respond to the terrorist acts
against the United States by apprehending those who would continue
to threaten the nation, even in the most serious times of war execu111
Most importive commander-in-chief powers are not limitless.
tantly, when the President acts in such a way that is “incompatible
with the express or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest
ebb.”112 In such a situation, Presidential claims to power must be
“scrutinized with caution” to prevent disruption of the balance of
powers set out by the constitution.113
As the President’s actions move from apprehending terrorists to
adjudicating guilt and meting out punishment, it becomes more diffi-

106. James E. Pfander, Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the
United States, 118 HARV. L. REV. 643, 757 (2004).
107. 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (2000); see also 10 U.S.C. § 817(a) (2000) (establishing jurisdiction of
courts-martial over members of the armed forces). The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
has jurisdiction to review all cases carrying a death sentence, all cases reviewed by a Court of
Criminal Appeals and has been referred for review by the Judge Advocate General, and those
which it granted review upon petition of the accused and showing of good cause. Id.
108. Pfander, supra note 106, at 754–55.
109. Id. at 722, 724.
110. Military Order, supra note 5, at pmbl.
111. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587 (1952) (stating that
“Even though ‘theatre of war’ be an expanding concept, we cannot with faithfulness to our constitutional system hold that the Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces has the ultimate
power as such to take possession of private property in order to keep labor disputes from stopping production.”).
112. Id.. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
113. Id. at 638.
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cult to argue that these actions are within the perimeter of the com114
mander-in-chief powers. Further, with justice issued at a manipulated locale and key decisions most likely being made in the United
States rather than on the spur of the moment in the midst of hostilities, the Executive’s claim for power to act without judicial review
cannot be justified by claims of battlefield necessities.115 Thus, the
federal courts should continue the practice of performing inquiry into
the procedures taking place at Guantanamo Bay, especially in situations involving the trial, conviction, and sentencing of detained individuals. Allowing for a more searching judicial review provides another branch of government with some level of oversight of a process
that has thus far, by most appearances, been controlled solely by a
few within the executive branch.116 Given the uncertain nature of the
balance of powers involved in the current Military Order and Commissions, a higher level of judicial review is thus needed to ensure the
constitutionality of the proceedings.
B. Rights of the Individual Under International Law
Even if the constitutional system of separation of powers is not
offended by the preclusion of all but the most limited judicial review,
final reviewing authority placed solely in the hands of the President
or the Secretary of Defense arguably violates trial rights protected by
international humanitarian law. Recognition and protection of individual rights has evolved considerably since the decisions in the
117
World War II commission cases, creating additional reasons to distinguish them from the current Commissions.

114. Neal K. Katyal, Executive and Judicial Overreaction in the Guantanamo Cases, 20032004 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 49, 56 (2004).
115. Amicus Brief of Military Commission Defense Attorneys, supra note 58, at 17–18.
116. Further, the possibility of this post-trial judicial review has been used by the government as an argument in favor of allowing the Military Commission trials proceed without interruption by litigation in the federal courts. Court of Appeals Transcript, supra note 96, at 5.
117. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. While beyond the scope of this note, it is
also notable that some have argued cases such as Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) and United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), provide support for the view that analysis
should not focus on whether enemy aliens detained abroad have rights, but whether the U.S.
government has any power to act inconsistently with the constitution. Jordan J. Paust, Antiterrorism Military Commissions: Courting Illegality, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 19–20 (2001). However, not all view such an interpretation positively. See Katyal, supra 114, at 54–55, citing Rasul,
124 S. Ct. at 2698 n.15 (calling the Rasul majority’s application of statutory habeas and reference
to Verdugo-Urquidez without qualification the “coup de grâce” of an overreaching opinion that
may even go so far as to apply the Constitution to detainees).
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Under Article 75 of Additional Protocol 1 to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, individuals outside the scope of protection of the Geneva Conventions shall enjoy certain minimum protections, including
conviction and sentence only by an “impartial and regularly constituted court” following “generalized recognized principles of regular
judicial procedure.”118 Likewise, Article 14 of the ICCPR guarantees
fair trial rights including hearing before a competent, independent,
and impartial tribunal as well as review of convictions by “a higher
tribunal according to law.”119
Although the treaty provisions may be derogated, Article 4 of
the ICCPR limits situations in which signatories may derogate their
responsibilities under the treaty to emergency situations, where notice is given, and where derogation is proportional to the emer120
gency. The guaranty of trial rights could not be derogated to carry
out trials by Military Commissions in this case, however, as Article 4
requires that an emergency and the corresponding derogation must
be temporary in nature, and thus is not satisfied by a “permanent risk
of international terrorism.”121
Therefore, under international law, the United States is required
to provide an independent and regularly constituted tribunal, even to
unprivileged combatants, if it seeks to try those individuals for offenses related to an armed conflict. From a technical standpoint, as
military tribunals are ad hoc and set up only for a specific purpose, it
is questionable whether they would be considered “regularly constituted” tribunals.122 Further, the procedures set up to try detainees by
the Military Commission involve adjudication and post-trial review by
the same military authority that captured and labeled them as enemy
combatants, thus utilizing a tribunal that is seemingly not very independent at all.123 This lack of independence is most poignant in re118. Protocol I, supra note 90, art. 75(4). The United States has not ratified the Protocol,
however it accepts many of its provisions, including Article 75, as declaratory of customary law.
Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes to War: Prosecuting Terrorists Before Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 653, 661 (2001).
119. ICCPR, supra note 90, art. 14.5.
120. Id. at art. 4.
121. Fitzpatrick, supra note 59, at 350–51.
122. Michael Ratner, Moving Away From the Rule of Law: Military Tribunals, Executive
Detentions and Torture, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1513, 1516 (2003).
123. See Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 118, at 659–60. See also Neil A. Lewis, General
Takes Three Officers Off Tribunal At Cuba Base, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22, 2004, at A21 (listing conflicts of interest which led to dismissal of judges from Commission, such as the supervision of an
operation which sent suspected terrorists from Afghanistan to Guantanamo Bay and service as
an intelligence officer in Iraq, while noting that a Marine Colonel who had lost one of his reserv-
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gards to the authority of the President or Secretary of Defense to perform final review of all decisions, especially in light of the power
given to the President to determine likely membership in al Qaeda,
enemy combatant status, and eligibility for trial by commission pursuant to the Military Order.
Thus, assuming that the trials continue before the Military
Commissions at Guantanamo Bay, judicial review by an independent
court, whether Article I or Article III, could act to satisfy international requirements for independent and regularly constituted tribunals. Such review would provide a check against any partiality on the
124
part of military judges, as well as fulfill both the letter and spirit of
the nation’s international obligations.
C. General Policy Concerns
Finally, other general policy arguments support a greater role for
the courts in reviewing the military tribunals. First, providing judicial
review offers a way to legitimize a process that has thus far been controversial both at home and abroad. Such legitimacy would be valuable not only for the commissions themselves, but for the convictions
and sentences that may be handed out at trial. Court approval – after
a thorough inquiry, rather than a perfunctory glance – that full and
fair trials were provided can go a long way in providing this legitimacy.
History has shown that allowing only superficial review by the
judicial branch will not guaranty that military commissions operate
according to proper judicial principles. Whether or not justice was
served by the final outcomes of Quirin and Yamashita, deference to
the procedures followed by the Government was later a source of re125
gret for members the Court. Especially in Yamashita and its com-

ists in the attack on the World Trade Center and an Army Colonel who was a “longtime close
friend” of the Appointing Authority were challenged but not dismissed); but see Hamdan, 344
F. Supp. 2d at 167 & n.13 (pointing to the fact that “some of the most distinguished civilian lawyers in the country” had been appointed to constitute the Review Panel).
124. Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 118, at 662.
125. See Tony Mauro, A Mixed Precedent for Military Tribunals: 1942 Case of Nazis on U.S.
Soil Gives Administration the Authority for Terrorist Trials, but Leaves Room for Doubt, LEGAL
TIMES, Nov. 19, 2001, at 15. See also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2669 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Quirin as “not this Court’s finest hour”); Orentlicher & Goldman, supra note 118, at 657 (“Much like [Korematsu], Quirin has long been criticized as an abdication
of independent judicial judgment during war time and an unwarranted surrender of constitutional rights.”).
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panion case, In re Homma,126 the trial procedures used to convict and
sentence defendants to death were antithetical to even the most basic
127
principles of our justice system, and it is perhaps telling that criticisms of these procedures were often espoused by those justices who
dissented from the holding that the Supreme Court lacked authority
to review the quality of justice in military tribunals.128
As the recent detainee cases have shown, today’s federal courts
seem unlikely to follow the “virtual hands-off” approach of Yama129
shita and Homma. Even the performance of deferential review of
the procedures and decisions of military commissions can have the effect of compelling the commissions to honor the trial rights of detainees,130 as the procedures followed and the level of protections afforded
to detainees are not only scrutinized by the courts but evaluated for
all to read in published judicial opinions.
Second, and undoubtedly a more important issue in the minds of
many Americans, is the protection of the nation’s own citizens and
troops abroad by upholding international standards for fair trials of

126. 327 U.S. 759 (1946).
127. In Yamashita, the Commander was charged with failing to control the atrocities committed by his troops, a charge which left the commission “free to establish whatever standard of
duty on petitioner’s part it desired.” 327 U.S. at 40 (Murphy, J., dissenting). Further, “the sole
proof of knowledge introduced at trial was in the form of ex parte affidavits and depositions”
which allowed no opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 53 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). In
Homma, the commission allowed forced confessions to be received into evidence and required
that findings made in a group trial for mass offenses be given full faith and credit in any subsequent trial of an individual member of the group. 327 U.S. at 761–62 (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
In both cases, the time allowed for preparation of the defense was less than a month between
arraignment and beginning of trial, and defense attorneys’ motions for continuance for more
preparation were denied. Id. at 762.
128. See Warren Richey, Tribunals on Trial, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Dec. 14, 2001, at 1.
129. See Martin, supra note 100, at 146–47 (stating that unlike the Yamashita court’s refusal
to address tribunal decisions regarding disputed facts, today’s courts “will rather plainly preserve some judicial role in considering the validity of the factual findings,” in regards to proceedings that determine enemy combatant status).
130. See id. at 135–36 (finding that judicial review of enemy combatant status determinations would provide “significant incentives” for those making such determinations, as well as
“provid[e] a genuine check on improper executive action”). Professor Martin acknowledges
that judicial review of military tribunals “is hardly a tidy system,” id. at 159, yet finds this beneficial for the process of establishing procedures to determine enemy combatant status:
[A] portion of the stimulus for the military to develop and sustain the right kind of
administrative process, with serious internal checks and balances, depends at least in
part on the military’s risk, in any given case, of encountering a cowboy district judge
whose intrusions are supposedly precluded by the deferential standards that are to
govern review.
Id. A similar argument can be made for the establishment and execution of trial procedures in
the Military Commissions.
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foreign combatants. In the past, even where not legally required to,
adherence to the Geneva Conventions and other human rights protections has benefited the United States by impacting the treatment
its own soldiers received from the enemy in armed conflicts.131 On the
other hand, the failure of the United States to offer protections in regards to fair trial and other human rights issues will act as encouragement and justification for other nations to follow suit.132
Finally, for each of these goals, it is “not only crucial that the tribunals meet both American and international standards of justice . . .
it is also essential that they are perceived to do so.”133 Thus, it may
not matter whether the Military Commissions are legally authorized
and exercising their jurisdiction, nor whether members constitute biased military officers seeking only to eradicate their enemies or distinguished attorneys from the civilian and military fields. Rather, the
mere appearance of impropriety, secrecy, or sham victor’s justice –
whether accurate or not – will be enough to condemn the use of Military Commissions in the eyes of the world. For these policy reasons,
thorough judicial review in an independent, civilian court is desirable
and necessary. “[T]he United States has told the world that it is fighting terrorism for democratic values and freedom. Certain forms of
military commissions appear to be most inappropriate in view of what
the United States stands for and what it has told the world it is fighting for and against.”134
VI. CONCLUSION
The current detention and prosecution of foreign combatants by
the United States in the War on Terror raises innumerable legal issues about our constitutional system of separation of powers, individ-

131. See Brief of Amicus of General David M. Brahms (ret.), Admiral Lee F. Gunn (ret.),
Admiral John D. Hutson (ret.), and General Richard O’Meara (ret.) at 2–7, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 125 S. Ct. 972 (2004) (No. 04-702) (providing evidence that adherence to the Geneva Convention resulted in lower U.S. casualties during past armed conflicts).
132. See id. at 8 (listing examples of nations who have cited United States policy to justify
their own repressive policies since September 11, 2001). In fact, the very term “Guantanamo”
has become a “metonym for the treatment of captives” during the war on terror, now encompassing “not only U.S. treatment of suspected enemies overseas and at home, but also U.S. concern about others’ treatment of American’s abroad.” Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 265 (2004).
133. Nyier Abdou, What’s Good for the Goose . . . , AL-AHRAM WEEKLY, July 31, 2003
(quoting Kevin Barry, a legal expert at the National Institute of Military Justice), available at
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/649/in5.htm.
134. Paust, supra note 117, at 10.
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ual rights, and role of the nation in acting as a protector of democratic
values and freedoms. Key to the War on Terror, as well as the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, is the apprehension of suspected terrorists. Further, in the aftermath of September 11, bringing such terrorists to justice is an important goal in maintaining peace and safety
within the nation.
Given this changing landscape, it is not surprising that old cases
and norms no longer provide the same clarity in regards to the legality of adjudicating the guilt of enemy combatants and meting just
punishments. Though the President may exercise discretion in dealing with the threat and prosecution of terrorists, it must not be done
at the expense of constitutional separation of powers, individual
rights, or international norms. Thus the Judicial Branch must play a
role in evaluating and reviewing the proceedings of the Military
Commissions and ensuring detainees receive the proper protections
under the law.
While the future of the Military Commissions and other procedures at Guantanamo Bay remain unclear, one thing is certain. In
creating policies for handling terrorism and national security, the
United States changes not only its own practices, but creates norms
for other nations to follow. Thus, at a time in which new democracies
hope to emerge in Afghanistan and Iraq, it is crucial that the United
States maintain its position as a nation guided by the rule of law.

